There are five key challenges to the structure of the above argument. The first is the incoherent idea of instrumental evil. Evil that is instrumental as a means to an end is not really evil. It may be called a trial. It may be called suffering. But if it brings about a positive end result, it cannot be considered evil. The word evil has nine definitions that relate to it in the Webster dictionary. They range from definitions as benign as disagreeable to as strong as wickedness. The nature of the above argument can be thwarted by a simple discussion on the use of the word evil. This challenge also only affects the category of natural evil, because the category of moral evil may have results that do not lead to a positive end.
Another objection is the idea of counter-productive evil. This would be evil that leads to soul-destroying. There are two counter-arguments that can be used to foil this objection. The first is, once again, the inclusion of the category of moral evil produced by significantly free beings. It is not specified for the purpose of soul-making, it is merely the effect of actions taken by significantly free beings. The second is the idea that the process of soul-making is a test and that to satisfy the stipulation of significantly free beings, the test must allow for failure. It is intrinsic to the idea of free-will that one is given moments in which one has the opportunity to fail. These moments also extend from the stance that there must be opposition in all things. If there is no chance at failure, there is also no real chance at success.
The third opposing argument is a problem with the economy of evil. It seems that for soul-building, God, being omnibenevolent, would only allow for the minimal amount necessary. The amount present in the world seems excessive. There even seems to be a disproportionate ratio between good and evil, favoring the evil. Examples of excessive natural evil can be seen in the destruction of natural disasters or epidemic illnesses. Examples of excessive moral evil can include the actions of figures like Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung. It is in thinking about these examples that the amount of evil evident in the world can seem overwhelming. It is difficult to know what is truly excessive in the eyes of God. The excessive evil may also be caused by moral evil that stems from the actions of significantly free beings. It can be difficult to comprehend why God would allow for so much evil, but it is in this instance that the transcendence of God must be used to refute such an argument. Only God is omniscient, and so it is impossible for a human being to be able to fully comprehend all the information that may be relevant to this discussion.
The fourth objection is similar in nature to the above argument; it is the idea of pointless-evil. William Rowe presented an argument for this objection in his paper “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”. He reiterated the objection in a more recent paper titled, “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil”. His argument focuses on the nature of pointless evil seen in the natural suffering of animals. He use the example of a fawn caught in a natural forest fire, is severely burnt, and suffers for five days before dying. Rowe draws the counter-argument below from out of this example.
1. Probably, there are pointless evils. (e.g., the fawn’s suffering).
2. If God exists, there are no pointless evils, therefore,
3. Probably, God does not exist.
The most common response to this follows along the same line as the response to the unequal economy of evil. God is omniscient, and it is injudicious for human beings to classify the evil in the world in this way because human beings do not have access to all the information that may be pertinent to the situation. It can also be flipped in the same way that Leibniz flipped Mackie’s argument.
1. Probably, God exists.
2. If God exists, there are no pointless evils, therefore,
3. Probably, there are no pointless evils.
This effectually shows the problematic nature of such an argument. The logical process proves two very different things based on the premises one subscribes to as true.
The final objection focuses on the idea that God could have created free beings that always choose right. This argument is contradictory in nature. Plantinga refutes this argument in his version of the free-will defense. He begins by showing that God is limited in creation or actualization by certain properties, because just as the beginning of God seems absurd so does the beginning of something like the color red. “Properties are not creatable: to suppose that they have been created is to suppose that although they exist now, there was a time at which they did not; and this seems clearly false.” It is possible that freedom could be one of these properties, and if such is the case, it is a property that may limit the nature of actualization or creation by God.
This world could be a result of that logical limitation. Plantinga shows the illogical nature of a world with significantly free beings that God created to always choose right. “If God brings it about that I refrain from A, then I do not freely refrain from A.” This objection is refuted by its contradictory nature.
The problem of evil is best contested by an argument that combines elements of John Hick’s soul-making theodicy and Alvin Plantinga’s free-will defense. The combination of these two philosophies with the added support of the theory of opposition, form a solid defense against and explanation for the problem of evil. John Hick shows that this world is in the process of becoming the best possible world. The process is necessary because the best possible world contains human beings that must necessarily progress. This progression can account for both the natural and moral evil seen in this world. The natural evil is a test that builds their souls. The moral evil is a result of the significantly free nature of human beings. This process and its consequences are exemplified in the story of Adam and Eve. Evil plays an essential role in the nature of this world and can only be understood through the lens of soul-making, free-will, and opposition.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Philosophy of Religion Paper Part 3
at 10:52 AM
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