A COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUL-MAKING AND FREE-WILL
“If the German people are already so corrupted and spiritually crushed that they do not raise a hand, frivolously trusting in a questionable faith in a lawful order in history; if they surrender man’s highest principle, that which raises him above all other God’s creatures, his free will. . .if they are so devoid of all individuality, have already gone so far along the road toward turning into a spiritless and cowardly mass – then, yes, they deserve their downfall.” (emphasis added)(1) Hans Scholl wrote these words in a leaflet in the summer of 1942. He was criticizing the acceptance of Hitler and his Nazi regime by the German people. Hans was a member of the group known as the White Rose resistance. This group stood against one of the greatest evils this world has ever seen in a manner that was both passive and brave. Their position was somewhat of an ironic stance because they stood against the evil of Hitler and his National Socialism on the grounds of freedom, specifically freedom condoned by God. It is that freedom, given by God, which allowed Hitler to commit the atrocities against a near innumerable amount of people. The existence of evil is often one of the most common criticisms of religious belief. The most solid defense against the problem of evil is a form of the free-will defense coupled with the soul-making theodicy.
Hitler is one of the greatest examples of the embodiment of evil. His policies led to the genocidal destruction of millions of people. The members of the White Rose were executed under his regime for professing the idea of freedom. The ironic nature to this is that their stance of, freedom condoned by God, is the stance that would be used in years to come to bring understanding to the problem that Hitler’s grave evils amassed against religious belief. It is understandable that someone would look at Hitler and the atrocities he committed and question the existence of God. It is only through the idea of freedom, or free-will, that the existence of God can be bolstered in the light of such great and obvious evil.
The problem of evil can be simply stated and seen in the connection of these four statements.
1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is omniscient.
3. God is omnibenevolent.
4. Evil exists.
These four statements do not seem as though they could all be true. If God is all powerful, all knowing, and wholly good, he would not have created a world where evil exists. It seems that because evil does exist that it would necessarily follow that God cannot exist in the form accepted by most Judeo-Christian traditions.
Before continuing on, the problem can be stated in another way that explains this argument in a more complete manner. This is J. L. Mackie’s take on the problem of evil.
1. If God exists, then God would be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
2. An omnipotent being could bring about any logically possible world.
3. An omnibenevolent being would want to bring about the best possible world.
4. This is not the best possible world.
C. God does not exist.
To attack the conclusion of this argument, one would need to reject one of the premises. Premise number 1 is the definition of God accepted by most Judeo-Christian religions. Numbers 2 and 3 seem to follow logically from premise 1. Number 4 is the premise that is most easily open to attack, because it is an opinion that this is not the best possible world. In reality, one could easily flip premise number 4 and the conclusion and render a very different outcome. Leibniz does just that.
1. If God exists, then God would be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
2. An omnipotent being could bring about any logically possible world.
3. An omnibenevolent being would want to bring about the best possible world.
4. God exists.
C. This is the best possible world.
The most logical response to the problem of evil would then come down one’s understanding of the best possible world.
Alvin Plantinga in his book, The Nature of Necessity, presents his version of the free-will defense. The goal of this defense is to show that there is a possible world that can include all four of the previously mentioned statements in relation to God and evil. His view looks to create a definition of the best possible world that is compatible with the discrepancy between God’s attributes and the presence of evil. His claim is that “a world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all.”(2) To understand this claim the definition of significantly free must be addressed. The definition of a free person means that they have the ability to perform an action or refrain from performing an action. To be significantly free, the ability to choose must apply to situations that have a moral significance. It was not possible for God to create a world where people were significantly free without the having the option for both moral good and moral evil. If God were to have excised moral evil, it would not have been possible for the world to then have moral goodness.
The above point plays into the idea that there must be opposition in order to create a world where people are significantly free. The theory of opposition can be seen throughout religious texts. It begins with the story of creation. God created heaven and earth, darkness and light, dry land and water, etc. It is evident again in the story of Adam and Eve and their partaking of the tree of knowledge in which they begin to understand the nature of opposition. The idea of opposition reoccurs all throughout biblical text; Moses versus the Pharaoh, Lot versus his wife, Christ versus the criminals hanging on the crosses, the Good Samaritan versus those that passed by, etc. This theory of opposition in relation to the free will defense explains why moral evil exists in the world.
(1)White Rose, “The First Leaflet,” Inge Scholl, The White Rose, trans. Arthur R. Schultz (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 73-74.
(2)Alvin Plantinga, “God, Evil, and Metaphysics of Freedom”, The Nature of Necessity, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 166.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Philosophy of Religion Paper Part 1
at 11:30 PM
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